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I show why Michael Friedman’s idea that we should view new constitutive frameworks introduced in paradigm-
change as members of a convergent series, introduces an uncomfortable tension in his views. It cannot be 
justified on realist grounds, as this would compromise his Kantian perspective, but his own appeal to a Kantian 
regulative ideal of reason cannot do the job either. I then explain how to make better sense of the rationality of 




The aim of our modified version of Kantianism […] has nothing to do with certainty or 
epistemic security at all. It aims, rather, at precisely […] universal rationality, as our 
reason grows increasingly self-conscious and thereby takes responsibility for itself. 
(Friedman 2001, 68) 
 
Such are the last sentences of Michael Friedman’s Kant Lectures published as Part I of the 
fittingly titled monograph Dynamics of reason. They make admirably clear what is at stake 
for Friedman: he sees it as philosophy’s responsibility to speak up for reason, and to uphold 
Enlightenment values in the face of a “widespread relativistic tide” (Friedman 2001, 57). In 
mounting his sophisticated defence of rationality he tries to offer a way out of the 
incommensurability conundrum bequeathed to philosophy of science by the work of Thomas 
Kuhn, but he also explicitly denies that his specific way of defending the rationality of 
paradigm-changes would commit him to scientific realism (ibid., 117). This denial might be 
seen as creating an uneasy tension in Friedman’s position, though (as argued, e.g., by Slowik 
200X), since he stresses the convergence of succeeding paradigms as an essential part of the 
paradigm-transcending rationality. But belief in such convergence is something that is 
typically underwritten by realist commitments: why would one expect it, if not because one 
believes that our scientific methods allow us to learn something about the true structure of the 
world? And it is a striking feature of Friedman’s presentation that he actually doesn’t seem to 
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offer much of an argument for this convergence: he only introduces the historical fact that it is 
possible to notice a kind of convergence from the Aristotelian to the Newtonian to the 
Einsteinian space-time theories, which in itself obviously cannot suffice to believe that this 
will continue to hold true. So, is he implicitly endorsing scientific realism in stipulating the 
continuing convergence? And if he is not, what sense can we make of his stress on the 
necessary convergence? A careful consideration of these questions might help us to reach a 
better understanding of the precise nature of Friedman’s defence of universal rationality. It 
will turn out that we should take his summary in the opening quote more seriously than most 
people might be tempted to do. 
 
2. The relative a priori and the dynamics of reason 
 
Friedman is probably best known for his forceful reintroduction of the notion of constitutive, 
a priori principles in contemporary philosophy of science. Taking his lead from Hans 
Reichenbach’s early work he argues that Kant’s views on the a priori prerequisites for natural 
science still hold promise if we distinguish between on the one hand the constitutive role of a 
priori principles, and on the other hand their supposed unrevisability. He stresses that a 
detailed analysis of the structure of Newtonian mechanics and special and general relativity 
shows that we should discern three different layers within these theories. On a first level we 
have purely mathematical structure (e.g. Euclidean geometry and calculus for Newton’s 
theory); on a second level we have a special class of principles, which allow the coordination 
of mathematical structures with empirical phenomena (e.g. Newton’s three laws of motion, 
which allow one to identify the inertial frames of reference in which one can then first 
unambiguously relate mathematically characterized paths of motion to their empirical 
counterparts); and on a third level we have the theory’s properly speaking empirical laws (e.g. 
the law of universal gravitation).  The most important point about this layered structure is that 
the different levels have an epistemologically asymmetrical function: the first two levels first 
allow us to ascribe truth values to the empirical claims of the theories, and thus are 
constitutive with respect to the third level. This asymmetry also implies that it makes no sense 
to think that the constitutive principles themselves could be tested empirically, since all 
meaningful empirical tests must already presuppose them. But this does not imply that for that 
reason they would be unrevisable, as the historical progression from the Newtonian to the 
Einsteinian space-time frameworks forcefully makes clear.  
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This does imply, however, that we are once again confronted with the spectre of radical 
incommensurability, as it is no longer clear how we can rationally decide to switch 
constitutive principles: it seems that that these principles in the first place make possible 
rational agreement, because they first constitute what Friedman calls “the empirical space of 
reasons” (ibid., 85). But this problem, which arises exactly because we can no longer hold on 
to Kant’s belief in the absolute unrevisability of constitutive principles, can be overcome by 
paying attention to another distinctively Kantian insight, Friedman claims. Kant’s keen 
analysis of the crucial role of constitutive principles was only possible because of his specific 
understanding of the task of philosophical analysis vis-à-vis scientific practice. He saw that 
the most fruitful position for philosophy was that of a “transcendental” meta-discipline which 
critically investigates the presuppositions of science. Putting metaphysics on the sure path of 
science implied giving up the false idea that philosophical analysis could proceed 
independently from science to give the latter its true foundations, but also resisting the idea 
that it had to be conceived as an extension of scientific insights to a further, supposedly meta-
physical domain. And it is exactly philosophy considered along these lines that historically 
provided the resources to make paradigm-change intelligible and made it possible to switch 
constitutive frameworks through a process of consensus-creating reasoned argumentation.  
Friedman argues for the latter point along two lines, with the first taking clear predominance: 
he first presents a subtle historical narrative, and he then gestures towards a philosophical 
argument. The historical story explains in convincing detail how Einstein’s revolutionary 
moves were only possible because of his engagement with the philosophical debates on space-
time that crucially included Helmholtz and Poincaré. And these philosophical debates in turn 
were a direct outcome of a critical investigation of Kant’s transcendental analysis of the 
conditions of possibility of (applied) mathematics. Side by side to the successful application 
of the Newtonian framework to ever more empirical phenomena (the Kuhnian process of 
normal science) was developing a lively dialogue on the “quid juris” of this framework, a 
dialogue which was initiated by Kant’s own analyses but further informed by developments 
internal to these mathematical and empirical sciences (just as Kant’s views were informed by 
the state of these sciences at his time). And it are these philosophical reflections which as 
“philosophical meta-paradigms or meta-frameworks” play “an indispensable role, by serving 
as source of suggestions and guidance – for orientations, as it were – in motivating and 
sustaining the transition from one paradigm or conceptual framework to another” (ibid., 46). 
Einstein could only have made his revolutionary moves because he operated against this level 
of philosophical meta-reflection; and exactly because his moves had this background, they 
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had to be taken serious and considered as live options in the science of his days. In the place 
of an empirical testing of the constitutive principles comes a sustained philosophical inquiry 
of their right to claim special status, which in the right circumstances (Kuhnian crisis) can 
help open up the conceptual space for the crafting of a new “empirical space of reasons”. 
Kuhn’s views on history of science only raise the spectre of irrationality because they unduly 
neglect the parallel evolutions in history of philosophy. 
In arguing for this point of view, Friedman introduces the notion of “communicative 
rationality”, which he takes over from Jürgen Habermas (ibid., 53ff). This notion is intended 
as an articulation of the Enlightenment faith in human rationality, by offering the ideal of 
“non-coercively uniting, consensus creating power of argumentative speech” (Habermas, 
quoted in Friedman 2001, 54). And this is exactly the kind of rationality that not only 
characterizes normal science (due to a shared empirical space of reasons), but also paradigm-
change (due to the presence of philosophical meta-paradigms sustaining well-articulated 
“argumentative speech”). Conclusion: we can still uphold our best mathematical sciences as 
exemplars of human rationality.  
It is after having added historical evidence that we can indeed describe paradigm-changes as 
communicatively rational, that Friedman adds that, “from a philosophical point of view”, “we 
can thus view the evolution of succeeding paradigms or frameworks as a convergent series, as 
it were, in which we successively refine our constitutive principles in the direction of ever 
greater generality and adequacy” (ibid., 63). This claim is backed up by historical evidence 
(the possibility of retrospectively approximating features of the old framework within the new 
one, and the possibility of “prospectively” seeing the new framework as arising out of the old 
through a continuous development – a continuity only made possible by the philosophical 
meta-framework, of course), but as already indicated in the introduction, its scope is actually 
much wider than can be established by purely historical evidence and the latter must thus be 
supplemented by philosophical argumentation – as Friedman himself indicates by introducing 
it as following “from a philosophical point of view”. This is further underscored by his switch 
to explicitly normative language in repeatedly stating that we should always be able to view 
paradigm-change in this way. These strong statements are backed up by an appeal to Kant’s 
conception of the regulative use of reason, which offers an ideally completed state of 
scientific progress as a focus imaginarius guiding all empirical research (cf. also § 3.2 below), 
but which Friedman now extends to also make possible “trans-historical universality” within 
the domain of shifting constitutive principles. This idea is inspired by Cassirer’s way of 
rethinking Kant’s transcendental idealism in the light of revolutionary changes, but Friedman 
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stresses that, more than Cassirer, he still wants to leave room for relativized constitutive 
principles within this ideal progression (ibid., 66, fn. 80) – providing temporary points of rest 
as it were. 
But why exactly do we need this regulative use of reason in our defence of rationality? At this 
point Friedman is disappointingly vague. It would seem that the appeal to philosophical meta-
paradigms already does the job of securing communicative rationality, in offering the 
possibility of coming to reasoned intersubjective agreement. Why does he want to add an 
appeal to an ideal of reason as giving extra, “trans-historical” direction to this process of 
argumentative deliberation? I think that a glimpse of the largely hidden motivation can be 
seen in the way Friedman introduces a summary of his views with the question: “how … can 
the proposal of a radically new conceptual framework be … both rational and responsible?” 
(Ibid., 66; my emphases.) But by thus indicating that reasoned intersubjective agreement 
might not be enough for fully universal rationality, this extra appeal to “responsibility” could 
lead us back to the suspicion that this hidden motivation is actually one of a kind with 
scientific realism – as realists typically portray it as the responsibility of scientists to uncover 
the world’s true structure, which true structure would then ground the convergence of 
scientific theories. As already mentioned, it is clear that Friedman himself does not intend his 
argument in this way, as he explicitly warns us that his views on the necessary convergence of 
successive frameworks must not be understood as “ever better approximations to a radically 
external world existing independently of the scientific enterprise itself”, since the “original 
Kantian conception of objectivity … was explicitly intended to undermine such a naively 
realistic interpretation of scientific knowledge” (ibid., 67). If we thus want to come to a better 
understanding of Friedman’s possible agenda in stressing the need of “responsible” paradigm-
change – and especially its relation to the series of converging frameworks – we must start by 
taking a closer look at this original Kantian conception of objectivity and its possible relation 
to present-day discussions on scientific realism. This will prove to be especially interesting 
because we will see that Kant’s own appeal to the regulative use of reason is closely 
connected to some of the issues that are at stake in these discussions. 
 
3. Transcendental idealism and scientific realism 
 
In the following I will propose a reading of Kant’s transcendental idealism which has to meet 
two constraints: it should be formulated at high enough a level of abstraction, such that it also 
can be used in helping to characterize Friedman’s position (this implies remaining as 
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uncommitted as possible on the vexed issue of the status of a priori forms of sensibility – 
Friedman definitely owes us further clarifications about the position such forms occupy in his 
modified Kantianism); and it should be a reading which fits Friedman’s claim that being 
Kantian implies not being a scientific realist. 
 
3.1 The transcendental stance 
 
One way to understand Kant’s transcendental idealism is seeing it as the outcome of a 
decision to take at face value the fact that we, human beings, have to think in confronting 
reality – and to let this fact provide its own norms in our philosophical views on this 
confrontation.1 Let me try to unpack this rather cryptic statement a bit. All classical (i.e., 
transcendentally realist) metaphysical positions have started from the supposition that reality 
has a determinate structure and that we must thus judge our knowledge by trying to assess 
how it fares in bringing this structure to light. But ascribing a determinate structure to reality 
is of course already the result of an act of thinking, whereas this structure is supposed to be 
completely independent of all human activity. Rather than deciding with the rationalists that 
reality in itself must already have an intellectual structure (a conclusion that is traditionally 
backed up by an appeal to God), or with the empiricists that we can never apprehend this 
independent structure (exactly because we are always forced to think), transcendental 
idealism decides to turn philosophical reflection away from this postulated structure and 
direct it on precisely the human acts of thinking which first allow determinate structures to 
have sense for us. Reflecting on what it means that structures can have sense for us implies 
that we have to ask what it actually means to be thinking about something, which then brings 
us to the central Kantian question: how does our thinking relate itself to its objects? The 
answer consists in noticing that this relation is (and can only be) brought about by 
presupposing certain (“objectivating”) conditions which then allow us to recognize and re-
identify objects under (universal) concepts. Thinking posits its own norms (the categories) by 
which any human can transcend her particular subjective perspective and relate this to an 
objective world shared by all human beings. And it is because of this norm-bound activity that 
we are first able to judge on the truth and falsity of empirical claims referring to this objective 
world – which is why Kant calls his transcendental analysis of these norms a “logic of truth” 
                                                 
1
 Kant-interpretation is of course a lively philosophical field in its own right, and I have neither the space nor the 
intention to defend my particular understanding in any detail here (but for the fact that it should meet the two 
constraints just mentioned). Let me just point to Allison 2004 and Longuenesse 1998 as two important works 
which have greatly influenced my reading of Kant. 
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(A63/B87). And it is the decision to take the functioning of these norms seriously which then 
brings the transcendental idealist to the view that it literally doesn’t make sense to ask what 
structure the world would have in itself, independently of our human way of knowing it: this 
is simply not the right kind of question. 
In stressing the fundamental decision lying behind transcendental idealism I follow Henry 
Allison in construing it as a philosophical stance. But it is important not to loose sight of the 
fact that this stance has important “metaphysical” implications. Most important among these 
is the absolute primacy of form over matter, which follows upon the highlighting of the 
necessity of a priori conditions in our cognitive approach towards the world. There simply are 
no facts of the matter independently of our cognitive activity which first allows us to ascribe 
structure to the world. It is important that this does not imply that the cognitive norms 
governing this structure-constituting activity would be arbitrary for that reason, as is shown 
by the transcendental deduction in which Kant proves their right to normative status by 
grounding them in the transcendental unity of apperception. It is of course impossible to enter 
here into the intricacies surrounding this proof, but it might be useful to recall that its kernel 
consist in the fact that the categories are shown to be indispensable to the constitution of a 
unified experience – they reflect acts of providing necessary unity to the merely given and as 
such indeterminate sensations. 
There is one more aspect about Kant’s transcendental idealism that will turn out to be relevant, 
and this concerns the thorny issue of “the thing in itself”. On Allison’s one-world account 
(which is explicitly endorsed in Friedman 1996, 441, n. 18) it is stressed (1) that talk about 
“things in themselves” does not refer to a separate class of putative entities which would be 
radically different from the mere appearances which are subject to our cognitive activity; and 
(2) that such talk is an unavoidable and necessary consequence of a transcendental perspective. 
Since in occupying such transcendental perspective a philosopher reflexively isolates our 
necessary cognitive contribution in confronting objects in the world, this implies a different 
(distinctively philosophical) way of considering these same objects than in our natural 
empirical considerations. And because of this reflexive act of isolation it must also be possible 
to bracket these constitutive conditions and refer to these objects as they are when considered 
independently from all constitutive conditions. It must be stressed immediately that such a 
consideration must remain void of cognitive content – we cannot genuinely think about 
objects when we consider them in this way, but for the indeterminate thought of an object in 
general. But it is not insignificant for that reason, because in doing so we highlight the fact 
that not their existence, but only their existence as objects depends on us: our knowledge of 
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the world is grounded, but not in determinate things independent from our approach to them. 
And this must stand as a warning against the illusions with which metaphysical realism 
presents us (which includes the trap of subjective idealism). We can add that the mere 
possibility of this dual consideration also teaches us something else of further significance: 
that our cognitive approach to things, although not arbitrary, does have an essential element of 
contingency. 
 
3.2 The regulative ideal and scientific realism 
 
By now I can be rather brief, as the most important point has already been established in 
pointing out the metaphysical implication of the transcendental perspective. Since the 
metaphysical assertion “that the world has a definite and mind-independent natural-kind 
structure” is supposedly “a basic philosophical presupposition of scientific realism” (Psillos 
1999, xix), Kant can apparently not be counted among the scientific realists (although it must 
be said that the use of “mind-independent” can be ambiguous, as Kant certainly is not a 
subjective idealist who believes that empirical reality is a product of our minds – a more 
careful formulation might be to speak about standpoint-independent structure). This is also all 
that Friedman seems to have in mind when he offers his curt dismissal of realism. We can say 
a bit more about the relation of transcendental idealism to the contemporary discussions on 
scientific realism, though; and this will prove relevant in assessing Friedman’s convergence 
claims.  
Scientific realists typically believe in the convergence of scientific theories to an accurate 
account of the true structure of the world because they hold on to some variant of the no-
miracle argument (cf. Slowik 200X, who claims that Friedman’s claims about convergence 
can only be intelligible when underwritten by this argument), but appeal to this argument is of 
course ruled out by the transcendental idealist stance: the idea that we could explain the 
success of science by its approximately mirroring the true structure of the world, where the 
latter is independent of all (scientific) theorizing, is just a vestige of transcendental realism. 
But what is more important, for Kant there is also no reason why we should explain the 
success of science along these lines. First, we have a constitutive framework which allows us 
to come to objective knowledge. Second, we have the regulative ideal of reason which directs 
us towards a progressive theoretical determination and unification of all aspects of reality – 
we make progress in science because that is what we actively have to search for.  This is of 
course not an “explanation” that would satisfy the realist, which is only to be expected as 
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Kant denies all sense to such explanation by (what for him must be void) postulation. But 
seen from the transcendental perspective it does show something relevant about what it is 
about science that brings people to think that we need to, or even could give such explanation. 
It is this regulative ideal of reason, actually a projected rather than given unity (a focus 
imaginarius), which through hypostatization fosters the illusion that reality would actually 
exist as completely and systematically determined; and Kant’s claim on the unavoidability of 
the transcendental illusions of reason can thus also explain the pull that realism continues to 
exert.  
It is important to point out that Kant explicitly warns against interpreting this regulative ideal 
as merely a heuristic or methodological device (e.g. A653/B681 – a passage that serves as 
motto to Friedman 2001): without it we could not even coherently use the understanding, and 
thus would not be able to ascribe empirical truth to any statement (A651/B679). How this is to 
be understood in detail is at least as much a matter of contention as any other claim in the 
Kantian corpus, but I think we can at least distil the following. The understanding, which is 
the faculty that forms concepts reflecting objects does so with an eye to finding unity in 
experience (it is driven to do so by its own immanent norms, cf. the transcendental deduction), 
but in doing so it cannot look beyond what is actually given to it in actual perception (which 
is of course a form of the problem of induction). The faculty of reason must thus assist the 
understanding through its ability to integrate different concepts; and the only way that this can 
actually help us to go farther than what perception can directly teach is by effecting this 
integration under the regulative ideal of complete systematicity in nature (allowing only 
“projectible” predicates as concepts, by necessarily interpreting observed order as belonging 
to larger, ideal structures of order). There are two things of immediate importance to notice: 
the regulative ideal of reason is dependent on the constitutive principles of understanding for 
its operation; but it nevertheless has an a priori normative force of its own (as is the case for 
the constitutive principles, systematicity could never be empirically falsified) which is again 
grounded in the possibility of unitary experience (rather than in meta-physical beliefs about 
the “true” structure of the world), i.e. in the possibility to use our understanding in forming 
truth valued statements about an objective reality.  
 
4. Reason’s responsibility 
 
In sketching this background to Friedman’s denial of scientific realism, we have actually 
gathered the elements which will now allow us to diagnose what seems to be a fatal ambiguity 
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in his characterization of inter-paradigmatic rationality through the idea of a convergent series 
of constitutive frameworks, guided by a regulative ideal of reason. It is not that such an idea 
would commit him to realism, as his reference to the Kantian pedigree of his position is 
indeed enough to ward off such suspicion. It is rather the idea itself of having a series of 
constitutive principles being guided by a regulative ideal which does not make sense when 
seen from within this Kantian perspective. 
We have seen that in Kant’s system, the regulative ideal of reason is indeed genuinely 
normative – and thus a candidate to ground communicative rationality – but we have seen that 
it is also dependent on a constitutive framework within which the ideal can further guide the 
understanding. In Cassirer’s modified version of Kantianism, which Friedman cites as the 
important source of inspiration for his own views, this dependency is inversed. The regulative 
ideal of systematicity takes absolute precedence, and a constitutive framework can only be 
defined as the set of principles which turn out to be preserved in the progress from theory to 
theory towards the projected complete system, and which as such are the conditions of every 
possible theory. But what about Friedman’s proposal? At any stage of development in a 
mature physical theory we do have a set of constitutive principles which determine the space 
of reasons and allow us to form truth valued statements about an objective reality. Within any 
such framework it makes sense to project the ideal of nature as a fully unified system, but 
what kind of unified world could be “trans-historically” projected to span all these 
frameworks? Empirical truth makes sense only within a constitutive framework (it is this 
possibility which grounds the latter’s special status), so speaking about the truth of the 
changing frameworks is precisely what cannot make sense (also according to Friedman (ibid., 
118)) – but as our exposition in § 3.2 should have made clear, this also takes away the ground 
under the transcendental justification of the normative status of the Kantian regulative ideal. 
The problem is of course that both Kant’s and Cassirer’s regulative ideal plays a role in 
(further) articulating what is ultimately one empirical space of reasons, and that it is not clear 
what sense it makes to speak about “convergence” of synthetic structures in the absence of 
such unitary empirical world – whether this would be interpreted realistically or 
transcendentally. I already noted in § 2 that Friedman gestures towards an argument rather 
than really providing one when introducing his normative remarks on the convergence of 
frameworks. It now seems that he actually gestures in the wrong direction. 
It is probably for this reason that, notwithstanding his stress on the convergence of 
frameworks, Friedman at one point speaks about “approximation to a final, ideal community 
of inquiry” (Friedman 2001, 64, my emphases). Such an ideal community would have 
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“achieved a universal, trans-historical communicative rationality on the basis of … fully 
general and adequate constitutive principles” (ibid.), which is of course a description of what 
Kant believed he had achieved! I suggest that we thus better understand Friedman’s view on 
what secures the ultimate rationality of paradigm-change as a very serious call to uphold the 
full promises of the Kantian philosophical project itself – but as exactly that: a project. And 
this makes good sense of his appeal to the necessary role of philosophy in making possible 
revolutionary change, as this role is actually a modification of Kant’s original transcendental 
deduction into a necessarily inconclusive transcendental reflection. And as such reflection 
cannot but start from the (cognitive) situation we are in (as was already the case for Kant), it 
also makes good sense of the requirement that a new constitutive framework should 
necessarily evolve continuously from the older one. And finally, there is still a way in which 
we could see this as “progress”: we do actually learn something – not because we gain insight 
in the empirical structure of reality, and even less because we would gain insight in the 
transcendent structure of reality, but because we gain insight in how we do, and can, 
cognitively approach empirical reality. 
In this sense paradigm-change is both less and more than communicatively rational. It is less, 
because it is not objectivity-constituting (which it for Habermas is, cf. the quote in Friedman 
2001, 54; and which it also would have to be if it were linked to Kant’s or Cassirer’s 
regulative ideal); but it is more, because it does exemplify another deep feature of human 
rationality. We saw in § 3.1 how a transcendental perspective unavoidably brings with it a 
distinction between things as they appear and things as they are in themselves. This was of the 
utmost importance to the Kantian project in that it curbs the pretensions of reason, and thus 
actually confronts it with its own responsibility – which is to grasp its (cognitive) autonomy. 
And this finally brings us back to Friedman’s curious invocation of responsibility besides 
(communicative) rationality. What the possibility of paradigm-change, and the concomitant 
historicization of reason, shows is that the contingency that characterizes our approach to 
reality runs even deeper than Kant could see; but this only further highlights that we have no 
choice but to take full responsibility for it – which now also implies that we must be ready to 
question even our most cherished basic framework when situation demands it. And it is in this 
sense that we should see ourselves as approaching, and as necessarily only approaching, the 
ideal Kantian situation: because only thus can we fully uphold the ethical-cognitive ideal that 
is part and parcel of the transcendental idealist stance. Only thus can “reason grow 
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